know that given a system S, we can construct in some stronger system S' a criterion of soundness (or validity) for 5 according to which all the theorems of 5 are sound. In this way we obtain in S' a consistency proof for 5. The consistency proof so obtained, which in no case with fairly strong systems could by any stretch of imagination be called constructive, is not of much interest for the purpose of understanding more clearly whether the system S is reliable or whether and why it leads to no contradictions.
However, it can be of use in studying the interconnection and relative strength of different systems. For example, if a consistency proof for 5 can be formalized in S', then, according to Gödel's theorem that such a proof cannot be formalized in 5 itself, parts of the argument must be such that they can be formalized in S' but not in S. Since S can be a very strong system, there arises the question as to what these arguments could be like. For illustration, the exact form of such arguments will be examined with respect to certain special systems, by applying Tarski's "theory of truth" which provides us with a general method for proving the consistency of a given system 5 in some stronger system S'. It should be clear that the considerations to be presented in this paper apply to other systems which are stronger than or as strong as the special systems we use below.
Originally the studies reported here were motivated by a desire to look more carefully into the following somewhat puzzling situation.
Let 5 be a system containing the usual second-order predicate calculus with the usual number theory as its theory of individuals, and S' be a system related to 5 as an (« + l)th order predicate calculus is to an wth except that we do not use variables of the (n + l)th type in defining classes of lower types. Tarski's assertions seem to lead us to believe that we can prove the consistency of 5 in 5'. On the other hand, it is known that if S is consistent then .S has a model in the domain of natural numbers. But if .S has such a model, then, we seem also to be able to argue, S' has a model in 5 because 5 contains both natural numbers and their classes. Therefore, we can formalize (so it appears) these arguments in S' and prove within S' that if 5 is consistent then S' is. If that be the case we shall have a proof of the consistency of S' within S' and therefore, by Gödel's theorem on consistency proofs, S' (and probably also S) will be inconsistent.
Indeed, since we need at least a system like S' to develop analysis and since these reasonings do not depend [September on peculiar features of the systems under consideration, we shall be driven to the conclusion that practically every system adequate to analysis is inconsistent.
In trying to examine exactly where the above arguments break down, we have found it helpful to formalize more explicitly certain truth definitions and consistency proofs with such definitions. The results of such formalizations as presented below, it is thought, bring out more clearly than usual certain features in the procedures of constructing truth definitions and proving consistency. For example, the use of impredicative classes is dispensable for defining truth but does not seem so for proving consistency; whether the number of axioms of a system to be proved consistent is finite or infinite seems also to imply much difference in formalizing a consistency proof; and the employment of variables of higher types in defining classes of a given type engenders essentially new classes even for systems which contain otherwise already certain impredicative classes. It turns out that the arguments of a paragraph back break down because of the relativity of number theory to the underlying set theory. As a result, certain intuitively simple reasonings cannot be formalized in even very strong systems. Thus, for systems S and S' related as above, no matter how strong they are, the following results hold for them if they are consistent.
If natural numbers are taken as primitive notions or introduced with the same definitions in both 5 and S', then (1) for some predicate (p in S', we can show that (j>(0), 4>(Y), ■ ■ ■ are all provable in S' but that ym(4>(m) D<£(ra+1)) is not; (2) for some other predicate <p' of S', we can prove </>'(0) and \/m((p'(m)Z)(p'(m + l)) in S' but not \fm(p'(m). These immediately yield new examples of consistent but w-inconsistent systems. On the other hand, if we choose in 5 and S' suitable (different) definitions for natural numbers, we can prove in S' that if 5 is w-consistent then S' is consistent and also prove in S' the consistency of S, but not the w-consistency of S. This also shows that although S' contains a truth definition for S, we cannot prove in S' that S must possess a standard or nonpathological model. In order to separate two different moments of a truth definition, we shall distinguish between a truth definition and a normal truth definition. If we can find in S' a predicate or a class Tr for which we can prove with regard to the sentences of S all the cases of the Tarski truth schema, we say that S' contains a truth definition for 5. If in addition we can prove in S' that all theorems of 5 are true according to the truth definition, then we say that S' contains a normal truth definition for ,S. This rather natural distinction will be assumed throughout this paper.
We are greatly indebted to Professors Bernays, Quine, and Rosser who have all generously helped us by scrutinizing our earlier proofs, suggesting criticisms, and pointing out fallacies.
2. A truth definition for Zermelo set theory. Expressions of Zermelo set theory are built up from the set variables Xi, x2, x3, ■ • • and three constants: the sign [ for alternative denial (Sheffer's stroke function, disjunctive negation), the sign V for general or universal quantification (all-operator), and the sign £ for the membership relation (belonging to). Parentheses for grouping different parts of an expression, although theoretically dispensable, are also employed. A sentence (or well-formed formula) is either of the simple ■form y(E.z or of the complex form p\q or Vyp, where we may substitute in place of y and z any variables, and in place of p and q any sentences. From among the sentences some may be selected as theorems.
However, since this section is concerned merely with the construction of a truth definition and not a normal truth definition, the selection of theorems is irrelevant for the considerations here. So just let us imagine for the moment that an arbitrary definite set of sentences are taken as theorems of the Zermelo theory.
The problem is to find a suitable system Si in which we can find a class (or a predicate)
Tr and prove as theorems the special cases of the Tarski truth schema for all the statements (closed sentences, well-formed formulas containing no free variables) of Zermelo theory.
To simplify the structure of the required metasystem, let us assume that the syntax of Zermelo theory (as well as that of every other system we consider) has been arithmetized after the manner of Gödel(A Then each expression (and in particular, each statement)
is represented by a definite number (say)(2) m. Let H(m) be the expression represented by the number m. The problem is to define in a system Si a class Tr of natural numbers for which the following holds: Naturally we can choose the metasystem Si in different manners, and the proof of (TS) would become somewhat easier if the metasystem we use is richer or stronger. However, since one of our purposes is to make explicit the material needed for constructing a truth definition, it seems desirable to choose as weak (or simple) a system as is conveniently possible. The system Si we choose may be roughly described as of equal strength as a second-order predicate calculus founded on natural numbers. It does not seem possible to use any system which is substantially weaker than this system Si (but compare the system S2 given below).
Si contains variables xi, x2, • • • for elements and variables Xi, X2, • ■ • for classes. Sentences are built up from simple sentences of the forms Xi£zX2 (the element Xi belongs to the element x2), etc. and XirjX2 (the element xi belongs to the class X2), etc. by truth-functional connectives and quantifiers Xi does not occur, aXiV^iAi^i -P)-
From Ax2 and Ax3, we can obtain all finite elements constructed from the null element by taking unit sets and sum sets. Ax5 states that every property or predicate of these elements which are expressible in Si determines a class of Si. This system is closely related to certain standard systems. Thus, on the one hand, it differs from the part consisting of the axioms of groups I-111 of Bernay's system (3) only in that Ax5 takes the place of the somewhat weaker axioms of his group III. On the other hand, it is practically of the same strength as a system proposed by Quine(4), although Quine uses in place of Ax3 an axiom stating that the sum set of two elements is again an element.
In Si we can follow either the definitions used by Bernays or those used by Quine and develop the ordinary number theory while taking certain elements as natural numbers. Thus, we can define with von Neumann(6) :
2.1. The number zero 0 is identified with the null element. 2.2. The successor Xi + 1 of a natural number Xi is identified with the element consisting of all the members of Xi together with Xi itself (i.e., the sum set of X\ and its unit set).
Then we can define the predicate Nn of being a natural number in either of the following two manners(6).
2.3. Nn(xi) if and only if \jXi((0r)Xi & Vx2(x2riXiZ)(x2+l)r)Xi))Dxir)Xi). The second definition is the definition of finite ordinals on p. 11 of Bernays [l, Part II], while ordinals are defined by the second definition appearing on p. 9, ibid. The possibility of developing number theory in Si with 2.4 in place of 2.3 has been explained to us by Professor Bernays in conversation.
Vx2((x2 £ xi V x2 = xi) D (x2 = 0 V 3x3(x2 = x3 + 1)). Recursive functions such as addition and multiplication can be defined in known manner(').
Hence, number theory can be developed in Si. Variables m, n, k, etc. ranging over natural numbers can be introduced by contextual definitions such as: \fm(pm stands for Vxi(Nn(xi)D0Xi), etc. The principle of induction can be proved, with the help of Ax5 (the class axiom), for all sentences of Si: 2.5. If (pxi is any sentence of Si, then ((pO & Vn(4>nZ)4>(n + l)))Dv'm(pm. From the considerations thus far, we see that Si is, in the matter of linguistic forms, an extension of the Zermelo set theory, and contains:
(1) variables of a higher type; (2) usual notations of general logic; (3) all expressions of the Zermelo theory; (4) the ordinary number theory. Therefore, according to an assertion of Tarski(8), if the axioms of Si are sufficiently strong, we can use Si as a metalanguage and define in it the concept of truth for Zermelo theory, with merely the help of names and predicates of expressions (or terms from the morphology) of Zermelo theory. However, since Si contains number theory and the syntax of Zermelo theory is assumed to have been arithmetized, we can use in Si natural numbers and their predicates as names and predicates of expressions of Zermelo theory. Hence, we may expect, with good reasons, that we can obtain in Si a truth class (or predicate) for Zermelo theory. The only remaining question is whether the axioms of Si are strong enough to enable us to prove the schema (TS). We shall show that the answer is positive. The constructions follow in their general line the methods developed by Tarski and others(9), although the demonstrations, as well as the exact theorems of the metasystem which are needed, are here exhibited more explicitly than by these previous authors.
With the arithmetization of the syntax of the Zermelo theory, we can define in Si syntactical predicates and functions for it. Let us assume that all the sentences (well-formed formulas) of the Zermelo set theory have been enumerated, and in particular in such a way that when a sentence is a part (1), Tarski requires that the order or type of the metalanguage should be higher than the language for which the truth definition is constructed. His notion of the order or type of a language seems to concern both the linguistic forms and the proving power of the language system. . In connection with the formalization of truth definitions, as presented below, we want to thank Professors Bernays and Rosser for extremely helpful criticisms of our earlier attempts, as well as suggestions on ways of making improvements.
[September of another, the part always precedes the whole. For each t, let F(t) be the ith sentence of Zermelo theory in the assumed enumeration.
For example, F(l) may be just xx£xi. We can define in Si three predicates M(m, n, k), T(m, n, k), Q(m, n, k), and a function Rm satisfying the following conditions. 2.6. M(m, n, f) when and only when F(m) is xn£xt.
2.7. F(m, n, f) when and only when F(m) is (F(n)| F(t)). 2.8. Q(m, n, f) when and only when F(m) is Vx"F(f).
2.9. Rm is the number of logical operators in F(m). Then the following elementary properties are easily provable in Si.
The definition of truth for Zermelo theory is roughly this(10) : a sentence (with or without free variables) of Zermelo theory is true if and only if it is satisfied by all finite sequences of sets of Zermelo set theory, and a finite sequence g satisfies (a sentence F(m) represented by the number) m when and only when F'(Tti), where F'(m) is the result obtained from F(m) by substituting simultaneously, for all its free variables xn (n among 1,2, • • • ), the nth term of g for xn(n). In the particular cases where F(m) is a statement (of Zermelo theory), it follows that m belongs to the class of numbers representing true statements when and only when F(m).
In Tarski's definitions, infinite sequences are used instead of finite sequences. This is not possible in our approach, because the axioms of Si only guarantee that all finite sequences of elements are again elements but not that infinite sequences are also. However, as we have sequences with any arbitrary finite number of terms, we can dispense with infinite sequences altogether in our considerations.
The definition for a sequence is simply this. An element Xi of Si is a finite sequence of elements of Si if there exists a number n (n = l, 2, ■ ■ • ) such that Xi is an «-termed sequence; and Xi is an w-termed sequence when and only when for all m, m>0 and m^n, there exists a unique element x2 of Si such that the ordered pair of m and x2 belongs to %. More explicitly, the definition may be stated as follows(12). (u) It should be noted that here, as elsewhere in this paper, we are trying to avoid the use of quotation marks and corners (cf. Quine [l, p. 33]). It is hoped that no serious misunderstandings or confusions will result from such a practice.
(12) In this connection we should like to mention an interesting alternative definition of sequences which was introduced by Professor Quine in his lectures already referred to and applies equally well to finite and infinite sequences: Sq(xi) when and only when V»2 fe£xO 3x3 3m(x2 = (x3, m) & m^O)). In other words, instead of labelling the terms of the sequences, we label the members of each term and call the sum of all these labelled members 2.15. The ordered pair (xi, x2) of two elements xx and x2 of Sx is the element of Si consisting of the unit set of Xi and the sum set of Xi and x2.
2.16. Sq(xi) (i.e., Xi is a finite sequence) when and only when
In Si there exist of course elements which are finite sequences according to this definition. Indeed, for each n and any n elements Xi, • ■ ■ , x" of Si, the set consisting of (xi, 1), (x2, 2), • • • , (x", n) is one such. Let us use the letter g as a variable ranging over those elements of Si which are finite sequences :
2.17. Vg(bg when and only when \Ai(Sq(xi)D</>Xi).
The jth term g¡ of a finite sequence g is the set correlated with j: 2.18. Xi£gy when and only when 3x2((x2, j)£g & Xi£x2). This definition involves a rather undesirable complication which would not arise if infinite sequences were employed instead. Thus, when g has only k terms and j is greater than k, we would want to say that g has no jth term ; however, according to this definition, g¡ would then be the null set. In such degenerating cases, we have the result that (g¡, j) does not necessarily belong to g. It turns out that this unnatural feature is harmless for our further developments in the sense that it does not affect the definitions and theorems in which we are mainly interested.
Next is the notion of "the sequence t(g, n, x2) obtained from g by substituting the set x2 for its nth term" : 2.19. (xi, wz)£/(g, n, x2) when and only when (my^n & (xi, ra)£g) \J(m=n & xi=x2). Using the preliminary notions introduced in 2.6-2.9 and 2.16-2.19, we can now characterize the notion of satisfiability ("gSm", meaning "g satisfies the mth sentence of Zermelo theory") by the following conditions:
M(m, n, k)Z)(gSm=gn(Egk);(2) T(m, n, k)Z)(gSm = (gSn\gSk)) ; (3) Q(m,n,k) 3(gSm= Vxi(i(g, n, Xi)Sk)). This recursive characterization can be converted into an explicit definition for "gSm" with known methods and then the concept of truth for Zermelo theory can be defined.
Dfl. Gl(g, m) when and only when 3« Bk(M(m, n, k) & gnÇzgk). Df2. G2(g, m, Xi) when and only when 3n3k(T(m, n, k) & ((g, n)vXi \(g,k)r,Xi))._ the sequence consisting of these terms. Thus, if Xy is a sequence, thej'th term of Xi is just the set of all Xi such that (x¡, j) £xi. When the sets or classes of a system are divided into types so that a set and its members are of different types, this definition has over the ordinary one the advantage of keeping the sequence in the same type as its terms. In certain cases, it seems necessary to use such a definition, replacing the definiens of 2.18 by (xi, j) £g and that of 2.19 by ((my=n & (xi, m)£g)V(iM = » & #i£*2))-When necessary, we shall assume that these definitions have been adopted instead of 2.16, 2.18, and 2.19 given in the text. For example, when we define truth for R in R' and prove 5.8 in the last section, we shall assume such alternative definitions.
[September Df3. G3(g, m, Xi) when and only when 3w 3k(Q(m, n, k) & Vxi((/(g, n, Xi), k)nXi)).
Df4. G(g, m, Xi) when and only when (Gl(g, m)\/G2(g, m, Xi)
VG3(g, m, Xi)).
Df5. Gj(Xi) when and only when VgVm(Rm^jD ((g,m) r]Xi = G(g,m,Xi))). Df6. gSm when and only when \/Xi(G¡tm(Xi)Z)(g, m)inXi). Df7. mr\Tr when and only when \fg(gSm).
Df5 amounts essentially to this: if Gj(Xi), then Xi contains all the ordered pairs (g, m) such that g satisfies m and Rm is no greater than j. In order to prove the conditions (1)-(3) as theorems of Si, we first show that for each j, there exists in Si a class Xi such that Gj(Xi) and that if Gr"(Xi) then for every g, gSm when and only when (g, w) belongs to Xi.
The next three theorems of Si are obvious from the definitions.
We prove the theorem that for each j there exists in Si a class Xi such that GjiXi). 2.30. sAT^GotXi)). 2.31. 3XiiGjiXi))D3XziGj+iiXz)).
Proof. Let Xx be a class such that GjiXi). Hence, by Df5, RmújZ) ((g, m)r¡Xi = Gig, m, Xi)). By Ax5, there exists a class Xz such that VgVmiig, m)r\Xz = Gig, m, Xi)). So, if Rt£j, then ((g, i)vXi=(g, i)r¡X2).
Hence, by 2.14 and Dfl-Df4, if Fmgj+1, then (G(g, m, Xi)=G(g, m, X2)).
Therefore, Ä<[^i+0((g, m)nX2 = G(g, m, X2)). Hence, by Df5, 2.31 is proved.
From 2.30 and 2.31, we have immediately:
2.32. For each constant j, we can prove in Si: 3Xx(Gi(Xi)). Moreover, by applying induction (the consequence 2.5 of Ax5) to the sentence 3Xi(Gi(Xi)), we obtain from 2.30 and 2.31:
2.33. VJ5Xi(Gj(Xi)).
We note that in order to prove 2.33, we require that bound large (class) variables be allowed in the defining sentence p of Ax5 for class formation. It will be emphasized later that this is one of the few places where such cases of Ax5 must be applied in our considerations.
Having on hand for each j the existence of some class Xi such that Gj(Xi), we want now to prove some kind of uniqueness theorem for these classes. As in the definition of G¡ we are interested only in the numbers m such that Rm ¿j, we shall prove merely that for all m where Rm áj, if Gj(Xi) and 
If VXiVXzVgVm((Rmèj
Proof. Assume that Gj+i(X3) and Gj+i(Xt). Then, by Df5, we have also: Gj(X3) and Gj(Xi). Hence, by hypothesis, if Rm áj, then (g, m)r\X3= (g, m)nXt.
Therefore, by 2.14 and Df4, if Rm^j+l, then G(g, m, X3)=G(g, m, Xi).
Hence, by Df5, the theorem is proved.
An immediate consequence of 2.34 and 2.35 is: 2.36. For each constant j, we can prove in Si:
Again, by applying the induction principle 2.5, we have:
This is the second place where we need a case of Ax5 in which the defining sentence for a class contains large bound variables.
The next theorem follows from 2.37.
Hence, by Df6, the theorem is easily proved. Proof. By 2.20 and
On the other hand, by 2.10,
. By 2.30, the theorem is proved. 
F(m) is of the form (p\q). We may assume that the sentence is (F(n)|F(f)).
Therefore, we can prove in Sx: F(m, n, Ï). Let F'(n) and F'(f) be related to F(n) and F(ï) in the same manner as F'(rrt) is to F(tn). By 2.41, gSm = (gSn|gSf). Hence, by induction hypothesis, gSm = (F'(rt)| F'(f)). Hence,
is proved, because (F'(n)| F'(f)) is F'(m).
Case 2b. F(m) is of the form V*np. We may assume that F(m) is the sentence VxnF(f). Therefore, we can prove in Si: Q(m, n, f). Let F'(t) be related to F(f) as F'(m) is to F(m) except that free occurrences of xn in F(f) are not replaced by those of g" in F'(f). By 2.42, gSm =Vx"(/(g, rt, x")Sf). Therefore, by induction hypothesis, gSm=\AnF'(E). Hence, 2.43 is proved, be-
From this the truth schema (TS) for Zermelo theory can be proved directly.
If F(m) is a closed sentence (statement)
of Zermelo theory, then we can prove in Si: m77Fr = F(m).
Proof. By 2.43, if F(m) is a closed sentence, then we can prove in Si: gSm = F(m). Hence, by Df7, m?7Fr = F(in).
Hence, we reach the main theorem of this section.
Theorem I. In Si we can construct a truth definition for the Zermelo set theory.
It may be worthwhile to emphasize here again that in this section we are merely concerned with the construction of a truth definition which need not be also a normal one; in other words, we do not assert that according to the truth definition given above, we can prove in Si that all the theorems of Zermelo theory are true. In order that in a system S we be able to prove such an assertion, it would be necessary to require that S contain Si, as well as theorems which answer to those of the Zermelo set theory under consideration.
This problem will be studied more carefully in a later section. Although, when compared with standard axiomatic systems for set theory, Si should be considered a very weak system, it already contains the impredicative feature (through Ax5) which separates typical set theories from more elementary disciplines. It is therefore of interest to note in this connection that we can also obtain a truth definition (but not a normal one) for Zermelo theory in a system which does not contain impredicative classes. Let S2 be the system which contains the same linguistic forms as Si and is obtained from Si by substituting for Ax5 the following axioms(13). Ax6. For every sentence p of S2 in which neither Xi nor any bound large variables occur, 3XiVxi(xi?;Xi = p).
We want to prove that in S2 we can also obtain a truth definition for the Zermelo theory. Since S2 has the same notation as Si, all the definitions in Si are also definitions in S2, except that it would be more correct to write Tr(m) in place of mr¡Tr in Df7, because there is no truth class in S2 but only a predicate. However, this point is not important for our purpose. Our problem is to prove a metatheorem for S2 which answers to 2.44 for Si. In the first place, when Ax5 is replaced by Ax6, the theorems 2.33 and 2.38 are no longer demonstrable, and we can only prove the metatheorems 2.32 and 2.39. Consequently, in place of the theorems 2.40-2.42, we can prove in S2 only the following metatheorems:
However, an examination of the proofs for 2.43 and 2.44 should make it clear that 2.45-2.47 are already adequate to the derivation of 2.43 and 2.44. Therefore, it would seem that we can define truth for Zermelo theory in S2 even without applying Ax7.
Such would be true if we could develop number theory in S2 without using Ax7. As a matter of fact, there seems to be no way of doing so, although it is known that number theory can be developed in S2 with the help of Ax7(14).
Consequently, we have the next theorem:
Theorem II. In S2we can construct a truth definition for the Zermelo theory. 3. Remarks on the construction of truth definitions in general(16). In order to exhibit the procedure of constructing truth definitions more explicitly, we studied in the previous section only two special systems. Here we indicate how similar considerations are applicable to other formal systems as well.
In the Zermelo theory we can consider the predicate £ as an operator for generating sentences from variables, and the logical operators | and V as operators for generating new sentences from given ones. Let L be an arbitrary system which contains one kind of variable just as Zermelo theory, but contains in addition to (or instead of) £, other predicates Pi, ■ ■ ■ , Pi, in addition to (or instead of one or both of) | and V, other operators Oi, • • -, G> Here again, we can suppose that the theorems of L have been selected in an arbitrary but definite way. Let L* be the system which is like Si except that it contains, besides the sentences of Si, also the sentences generated by the predicates Pi, After these changes in the definitions, it would be a routine matter to modify the proofs in the preceding section and demonstrate two theorems in L* which are notationally the same as 2.33 and 2.38. From these two theorems, theorems answering to 2.40-2.42 can be proved with analogous proofs. Hence, we have: Theorem III. If L is any system with one kind of variable and L* contains Si, as well as all sentences of L, we can construct in L* a truth definition for L.
In the above proof, we have assumed that the number of predicates and logical operators is finite. The theorem also holds if in L either the number of predicates or that of logical operators or both are denumerably infinite. In such a case, some further modifications in the procedure are necessary, for otherwise we would need for the definition of G(g, m, Xi) an infinite alternation of clauses. We can proceed in the following manner. Define, as in DflDf3, Gl, G2, •■■ for all the predicates and logical operators. Let F(m) be the mth sentence of L, Rm be the number of logical operators in F(m), and (16) Later sections are independent of the material contained in this section, which can be omitted by a reader interested only in the few conclusions regarding the relativity of number theory and induction, to be presented in the last part. With these definitions we can prove for L* metatheorems answering to 2.32 and 2.39 (although not the theorems corresponding to 2.33 and 2.38), and therefore those answering to 2.45-2.47. However, these are precisely what we need in order to prove the metatheorems for L and L* which answer to 2.43 and 2.44 for Zermelo theory and Si. Hence, in these cases, we can also give in L* a truth definition for L. In other words, Theorem III holds true no matter whether L contains finitely or (denumerably) infinitely many predicates and logical operators.
We insert here a few remarks on function symbols and constant names. We have thus far been assuming that systems are so formulated that function symbols and constant names do not occur among their primitive notations. Such an approach seems to be in accord with Tarski's procedure. And it is partly justified by the assertion(16) that when we use sufficiently many predicates, constant names and function symbols are theoretically dispensable. Nevertheless, it must be admitted, the alternative procedure of including among the primitive notation of a system constant names and function symbols from which terms are generated seems to be more intuitive and tends to clarify matters in many connections.
However, if we consider a system formulated with terms among its primitive notation, the construction of a truth definition for it would have to differ considerably from what is described in the preceding section. Moreover, for such systems it would often appear possible to construct truth definitions with more direct and intuitive methods(17). Since considerations regarding such possibilities would lead us far afield, we shall continue to assume that no function symbols or constant names occur in the primitive notations of the systems which we study.
So far we have restricted ourselves to systems each containing only one (17) If we compare the truth definition for number theory in Hilbert-Bernays, vol. 2, with the truth definition for Zermelo theory elaborated in the present paper, it seems fair to consider the former more straightforward and intuitively simpler, involving a more direct recursion. It is not very easy to determine the exact conditions which a system must satisfy in order to possess such a truth definition. See also the observations in the paragraph between parentheses on p. 63 of Tarski [3], kind of variable in its primitive notation. Let us now consider the case where a system contains many kinds of variable.
The simplest way of handling such a case seems to be the following: consider instead of the given system with many kinds of variable (a manysorted system) an "equivalent" system with one kind (a one-sorted system). Since we know this is always possible(18), we seem to be able to avoid altogether the question of defining truth for many-sorted theories. However, since in certain cases it is more natural to use many kinds of variable, it is desirable to consider directly how we can construct a truth definition for a given many-sorted theory. In this connection, Tarski has given indications as to how we should proceed (19). We state merely the general conditions which a metasystem should satisfy. Given a one-sorted system, what do we need in a metasystem in order that it be adequate to defining truth for the given system? If we examine the construction of truth definition for Zermelo theory, we see that the following things are needed: (1) General logic (quantification theory and theory of identity)
for each kind of variable in the metasystem; (2) ordinary number theory together with variables m, n, ■ ■ ■ ranging over natural numbers; (3) sufficient resources for defining all finite sequences of entities of the given system and for introducing a variable g which ranges over such sequences; (4) existence of a class of ordered pairs of g (a finite sequence) and m (a natural number), corresponding to each sentence of the metasystem which contains g and m as free variables.
Let K be an arbitrary many-sorted theory. In order that a system K* be adequate as a metasystem in which we can define truth for K, K* must contain materials similar to those listed under (l)-(4). The only important necessary alteration is with regard to item (3). To satisfy a sentence of K with n free variables, we need a suitable sequence with n terms such that for each k between 1 and n, the &th term is an object falling within the range of values of the &th free variable in the given sentence. Hence, it is necessary that, besides the things listed under (1), (2) , and (4), such finite sequences g of arbitrary terms from K be obtainable in K*. Roughly speaking, if K* contains number theory, we need only classes which take as members all entities of K, because finite sequences and ordered pairs can usually be defined with the help of natural numbers. Thus, for example, if K is the predicate calculus of the ith order founded on natural numbers, then it is sufficient to use the predicate calculus of the (i+ l)th order as K*(20). 4. Consistency proofs via truth definitions. It seems to be widely believed that once we have in L* a truth definition for L, it is then a routine matter to formalize in L* a consistency proof for L. Probably partly on account of this belief, details of such consistency proofs are usually not supplied. However, as we remarked before, in order to prove in L* the consistency of L through a truth definition, we also have to prove in L* that all theorems of L are true by the definition; and such a proof not only calls for strong axioms in L* but usually also involves a number of complications.
We consider in this section a few special cases of such consistency proofs.
Consider first a weak and simple system S3 of set theory. The linguistic forms of S3 are as given in §2 for the Zermelo theory. The theorems of S3 are specified in the following manner. The proper axioms of S3 are just the axioms Axl-Ax3 of the system Si. Moreover, all axioms of the quantification theory as given below are also theorems of S3:
Ql. PDiqDp). Q2. iPDiqDr))DiipDq)DipDr)). Q3. i-pD-q)DiqDp).
Q5. If x is not free in p, p~y*Jxp.
Q6. y/x(pxZ)<py.
The only rule of inference is modus ponens for closed sentences. Q7. If p and pZ)q are theorems, then q is also. It should be noted that, following Quine(21), we do not allow free variables to occur in theorems. Thus, when a sentence is listed as an axiom or a theorem, we mean actually that a closure of the given sentence (i.e., a closed sentence obtained from the given sentence by prefixing distinct general quantifiers for all its free variables) is an axiom or a theorem. Moreover, we also follow Quine in calling Vxp a vacuous quantification when x is not free in p. By Theorems I and II, Si and S2 each contains a truth definition for S3. Moreover, all the theorems of S3 are also theorems of Si and S2. We now show that the consistency of S3 can be formally proved in Si. In all probability no consistency proof for S3 can be formalized in S2, although we possess no proof of the impossibility.
Since Si contains number theory, syntactical notions for S3 can be defined in Si through an arithmetization of the syntax of S3. In particular, we assume that the following notions have been defined in Si: D(w, n, k) (F(w) being We note incidentally that we can fix on an arbitrary enumeration of all the proofs of S3. We assume merely that the enumeration is made in such a way that when the mth proof contains the wth proof as a proper part, then m>n in the enumeration. 'DVy(t(g, n, y)Smi))). Therefore, by the quantification theory in Si, gSm.
Hence, by Df7, mvTr. t(g, 2,x) , 1, y))i£(/(/(g, 2, x), 1, y))2 = iititig, 2, x), 1, y))i£(/(/(g, 2, x), 1, y))3Wz((¿(/(Ag, 2, x), 1, y), 5, z))6
Gitititig, 2, x), 1, y), 5, z))x = itititig, 2, x), 1, y), 5, z))6£(/(/(¿(g, 2, x), 1, y), 5. z))4))). Therefore, by 4.5, writing a in place of (t(t(g, 2, x), 1, y)), we Proof. If pr(w, m), then 3&(X(«)^F). Therefore, by 4.10, 4.11, and the induction principle 2.5 of Si, 4.12 is proved.
The consistency of S3 can now be proved.
Theorem
IV. I-Sl -pr(w, nt0). Or \-Sl Con (Si).
Proof. By definition, F(m0) is the sentence Vx2 3xi(xi£x2), the denial of which is equivalent to Ax 2 of S3. Therefore, thm (neg (m0)) and, by 4.12, neg (mi)r¡Tr. Hence, by 4.6, -nto^Fr and, by 4.12, -pr(n, mo). Therefore, we have also: Con (S3).
This completes the formalization within Si of a consistency proof for S3. We now make a few remarks on the relation between analogously related systems.
If S is any set theory which has the same notation as S3 but contains in addition to all the axioms of S3 also a finite number of other set-theoretical axioms, and S' is related to S as Si is to S3; then we can formalize similarly in S' a consistency proof for S.
However, if S should include an infinite number of set-theoretical axioms (i.e., include axiom schemata beyond quantification theory), then the situation would be different.
Thus, let S4 be the ordinary Zermelo set theory which has the same notation as S3 but contains beyond Axl-Ax3, the axioms of infinity, sum set, power set, and the following axiom schema (the Aussonderungsaxiom) (23) : Ax8. If p is any sentence of S4 in which x2 is not free, then 3x2Vxi(*i£x2=Axi£x3 & p)). Let S6 be the system obtained from Si by adding the extra axioms of 54. Can we prove Con (Si) (as a sentence of Si) to be a theorem of Ss?
Professor J. Barkley Rosser has observed in correspondence that we cannot do this with the above method of proving IV. More specifically, the proof for the analogue of Case lb of 4.7 would break down, the crux being that we would need something like an infinite alternation of sentences. As a result, we can prove only the analogue of 4.9 (but not that of 4.8), and therefore we cannot prove an analogue of 4.10.
Since S5 contains a truth definition of S4 as well as all the theorems of S4, we would expect Con (S4) to be provable in S6 by some alternative method. However, our attempts for obtaining such a proof have not been successful. We even suspect that there might be a way of demonstrating the unprovability of Con (S4) in S¡. In any case, so far as we know, the provability or unprovability of Con (S4) in Si remains an open question. We have assumed the same axiom Ax8 in both S4 and S6, allowing no class variables to occur in the sentence p. If we extend the system S5 and replace Ax8 by a similar but stronger Ax8' in which p may be any sentence of 55, then a proof of Con (S4) can indeed be obtained in the resulting system (23) Compare for a description of these other axioms Wang [2] , Si. Thus, we can proceed exactly as in the proof of Theorem IV except that in proving an analogue of Case lb of 4.7, we employ special treatments for the alternative when F(m) is of the form 3x2V^i(^i£^2 -(xi£x3 & p)) as given in Ax8. There are of course infinitely many sentences of S4 which are of this form, but for each F(m) of such a form, there exists a natural number j such that F(m) is 3x2Vxi(xi£x2=(xi£x3 & F(j))). Hence, by arguments similar to those used in the proof of 4.7, we can prove in Si something like: gSm= 3xVy(y£# -(y£a & gSj)), a being a term of S4 which takes sets as values. But the right-hand side of the equivalence is a case of Ax8' (although not a case of Ax8 on account of the class variable occurring in gSj through an analogue of Df6). Therefore, we have in Si: gSm. In this way we can prove: 4.13. r-si Con (S4).
Similarly, if a system S' is related to a system S as a predicate calculus of the (« + l)th order founded on natural numbers is to one of the nth order, we can prove Con (S) in S'; but if we weaken S' by stipulating that no variables of the highest type are allowed in defining sets of lower types, then the question whether Con (S) is provable in the resulting system seems to remain open.
Another point worthy of some consideration is the question of proving Con (S3) in S2. In the proof of Con (S3) (as a sentence of Si) in Si, the induction principle 2.5 is applied at four places (viz. in the proofs of 2.33, 2.37, 4.7, and 4.12) in such a manner that analogous arguments do not seem formalizable in S2. Hence, a similar proof of Con (Si) cannot be carried out in S2, although, as we mentioned before, we have not been able to obtain a proof for the assertion that Con (S3) as an arithmetic sentence in S2 is not provable in S2.
If we want to prove Con (S3) (with the arithmetic notions involved as defined in Si) in S2, we must try to avoid the applications of induction to sentences containing bound class variables, such as in the proofs of the theorems (answering to) 2.33, 2.37, 4.7, and 4.12. But it does not seem possible to avoid all these applications.
One crucial point seems to be the presence of a rule of inference (the rule Q7 of modus ponens) in S3 which permits us to infer a shorter sentence from longer ones. If we could so reformulate S3 that all its rules of inference are such that we can only infer a longer sentence from some definite finite number of shorter ones, then, no matter whether the number of axioms be finite or infinite, we would be able to prove Con (S3) for the reformulated S3 without applying those inductions. Indeed, if that were possible, we would have a decision procedure for S3, and the proof of Con (S3), as can be expected, would be quite simple.
It may be of interest to note that we can prove in place of Con (S3) the following metatheorem about S2 which tells us that no given definite proof It is known(24) that given any two systems S" and S related to each other as S2 is to S6, the relative consistency of S" to S can be proved. Furthermore, the proof can be formalized in each ordinary system which is roughly as strong as Si or a second order predicate calculus founded on natural numbers.
In other words(26), 4.18. If S" is related to S as S2 is to So, and S'" is an ordinary system roughly no weaker than Si, then (-a»> Con (S)D Con (S"), Con (S) and Con (S") being arithmetic sentences of S'" representing respectively the consistency of S and S". Therefore, if we choose S and S" in such a way(26) that arguments which can be carried out in Si can also be carried out in S", then Con (S) DCon (S") as a sentence of S" becomes a theorem of S" and therefore, by Gödel's second theorem, Con (S) cannot be provable in S" unless S" is inconsistent^).
4.19. If S and S" are related as before and S" contains Si, then Con (S) is not a theorem of S" unless S" is inconsistent.
However, if the arithmetic sentence Pc(n) of S" represents that the rath proof of S is the proof of a definite refutable sentence of S (i.e., a sentence such as 0 = 1 whose denial is known to be provable in S), then y/n(-Pc(n)) may be taken as Con (S) and we can prove:
4.20. If S and S" are as in 4.19, then \-s"-Pc(n), n being any given (26) por example, S" would be like that if we choose as S the system St or the system N in §2 of Wang [4] .
(27) See footnote 31 below.
number.
In other words, in such a case although Con (S) is demonstrably unprovable in S", we can prove by elementary considerations about S" that no proof of S can be given which is a proof of a previously fixed refutable sentence of S. Indeed, such considerations can be formalized in number theory and we can prove in number theory an arithmetic sentence Con* representing that for every number n, if it is for a certain numeral m of S" the number of a sentence -Pc(m) of S", then the rath sentence of S" is a theorem of S". Since S" is assumed to be at least as strong as Si which contains number theory, Con* as a sentence of S" can also be proved in S" although Con (S) cannot. 4 .21. If S and S" are as in 4.19, then hs» Con*.
If we assume that all theorems of S" are true in some definite sense, Con* may also be taken as expressing indirectly the consistency of S(28). But, it has to be admitted, this is not very clear.
5. Relativity of number theory and in particular of induction. In each of many different forms of set theory, we say that we can develop the ordinary number theory.
Sometimes within a same set theory we can also develop number theory in more than one way. Naturally the number theory which we obtain is in each case relative to the axioms of the set theory as well as to the definitions we adopt for the arithmetic notions. If we consider each set theory as a theory for the set concept, then the number theory and the arithmetic concepts we obtain in each case are also relative to the underlying set concept. In particular, in each system of set theory which contains number theory, the principle of induction becomes a set-theoretical principle derivable from the axioms of the system ; and whether induction is applicable to a certain sentence of the system depends both on the strength of the axioms of the system and the definitions for the arithmetic notions such as those for the number zero, for the successor function, and for the predicate of being a natural number (or for the class of all natural numbers). In this section we shall illustrate the connection between number theories and their underlying set theories with some rather striking examples.
Let us consider first a system R which has the same notations as S3 (or as Zermelo set theory) and contains Q1-Q7, plus certain stronger proper axioms in place of Axl-Ax3. These axioms are, roughly speaking, such as to guarantee the development of ordinary number theory, the existence of infinite sets of natural numbers and predicative classes of such sets. In strength R amounts to a system related to a second-order predicate calculus founded on natural numbers as the von Neumann-Bernays set theory is to the ZermeloFraenkel. However, to facilitate considerations about the system, we are presenting it in a rather unnatural form. Thus the general variables x, y, z, • ■ • of R are understood roughly as ranging over natural numbers, Identity is defined as in S3: 5.5. x=y for ^fz(zGx = zGy).
The proper axioms of R can now be stated. Rl. Axiom of extensionality. x=yZ)(xEzZ)yG.z). R2. Existence of denumerably many entities of the lowest type. It should be emphasized that R4 can actually be replaced by a small finite number (7 being sufficient) of axioms so that the number of the proper axioms of R become finite. We shall assume such a reduction has actually been made so that R contains only a finite number of axioms (besides the quantification axioms Q1-Q6). Consequently, the method of consistency proof for S3 is applicable to R.
We know that number theory can be developed in R in different ways. To be explicit, we assume that number theory is developed in R in the following manner(29).
By R3 and R4, 3a\ft(tGa=-tGt).
Therefore, 3a\/t(ay±t). Hence, by R2, if we substitute a for both c and b, 3t\fs(sGt = sy^s). Take this set t as the number zero. By R2, for every /, there exists an 5 (the unit set of t) which contains t as the only member. For every natural number /, let the unit set of t be its successor t + i.
Let the set of natural numbers t be the intersection of all sets which contain zero and the successor of each of its members.
5.6. Nn(/) for V*((0£x & Vs(sGxDs+lEx))Z)tGx), or ¿£Nn or Nn(t) for Va((0£a& Vs(í£aDí+l£a))D<£a).
We note that on account of R3, the two alternative ways of defining Nn are really the same.
According to 5.6 and R4, if yfmd>m stands for Vt(Nn(t)Z)(pt), then we have 5.7. If (p isas in R4, then (tpO &v'n((pnD(p(n + l)))Dv'm(pm.
Let R' be a system with the same notation as Si and related to R as Si is to S3. In other words, R' is exactly like Si except for containing R1-R4 in place of Axl-Ax3; or what is the same, R' contains Ax4-Ax5 in addition to the axioms of R. Number theory can be developed in R' in exactly the same manner as in Si, for instance, by defining zero and successor as in R but defining Nn(¿) as in 2.3 (or, what is the same, by replacing x by X in 5.6). Using such a definition for Nn, we can prove in R' a principle of induction applicable to all sentences of R' (just like 2.5).
Let us assume that the syntax of R and that of R' have both been arithmetized in the usual manner, yielding two arithmetic statements Con (R) and Con (R') which express respectively the consistency of R and R'. If the arithmetization is carried out in the framework of a set theory, then the exact expansion of the arithmetic statement Con (R) or Con (R') depends on the definitions we adopt for the arithmetic notions. Thus, since in R and R' we just assumed different definitions for Nn, the arithmetic statements expressing the consistency of R and R' are different in the two systems. Let Com (R) and Coni(F') be the arithmetic statements of R which express respectively the consistency of R and R', and Con2 (R) and Con2 (R') be those of R'. Let further Rf be the system obtained from R by adding Com (R) a a new axiom, then there are also arithmetic statements Coni (Rf) and Con2 (Rf) respectively of R and R' which express the consistency of Rf.
Using the method of proving Con (Si) in Si, we can prove: 5.8. \-B. Con2 (R). Moreover, applying the method of a previous paper(30), we can also prove:
5.9. \-R> Con2 (Rf)DCon2 (R').
As Rf is a natural extension of R with an additional axiom whose truth is guaranteed by the consistency of R, we would expect the provability of the relative consistency of Rf to R as expressed by: (1) Con2 (F)Z)Con2 (Rf). However, if that were provable in R', we would obtain from 5.8 and 5.9: V-R' Con2 (R'). Then R' would be inconsistent^1).
Therefore (1) cannot be provable in R'. But why?
(30) See the argument for proving the relative consistency of N' to N in §2 of Wang [4] .
(31) As we mentioned in the introduction, a reasoning roughly like this was what motivated the investigations reported in this paper. Our interest in this problem was first caused by Professor Rosser's remark to us that if we could prove the relative consistency of the von Neumann-Bernays set theory to the Zermelo (without the axiom of substitution) with fairly elementary means, the former system would be inconsistent. From the summer of 1949 on, we have tried to combine this with the proof in Wang [4] referred to in the preceding footnote. (For an explanation of the relation between results in this paper and similar conclusions presented by myself and others elsewhere, see last section of the present paper, added after the other sections were completed.) [September Indeed, using an argument which Dr. John G. Kemeny told us in conversation, we can prove the following: 5.10. ha' Coni (F)DCon2 (Rf).
Thus, since R' contains a truth definition for R, we can derive from Coni (R) and the truth schema that the number of Coni (R), like the numbers of all the theorems of R, belongs to the truth class Tr. Therefore, we would be able to prove Con2 (Rf) in the same way as Con2 (R).
In short, the difficulty lies in the inference from Con2 (R) to Coni (F)(32) :
Theorem V. If we can derive Conx (R) from Con2 (R) in R', then R' is inconsistent.
The reason why no such derivation is available seems to be the following. Let us call a set or class inductive if it contains 0 and the successor of each of its members. In R and R' the class of natural numbers is the intersection of all the inductive classes of R and R' respectively.
Since R' contains more classes and therefore more inductive classes, their intersection is smaller than the corresponding intersection in R. Hence, it is possible that there exists some nonstandard model for R which contains more natural numbers than any model of R'(3Z). Accordingly, as Con (R) amounts to an assertion that no natural number represents a proof of contradiction, it is conceivable that although no natural number of R' does so, some natural numbers of R do. At any rate, there is no obvious reason to think that we can prove in R' such is impossible.
Alternatively, we may want to use in R' the same definitions for the arithmetic notions as in R. Then we have instead of the two arithmetic statements, merely the one statement Coni (R) for both systems. But then we can no longer prove Coni (R) as we proved Con (S3) in Si, since we have in R', with such definitions, only the induction principle 5.7, while a stronger induction principle is needed for proving analogues of 2.40-2.42. Indeed, if we could prove Coni (R) in R', R' would be inconsistent either by Theorem V or by the following 5.11 and 5.12. Thus, using proofs similar to those for 5.9 and 5.10, we can prove:
5.11. \-r> Conj (F£OConi (A")-
ha» Com (F)DConi (Rf).
Since the only hindrance in the way of proving Coni (R) in Rr is the two applications of induction on sentences containing large variables (as we have (32) Theorems V and VI are due essentially to Professor Rosser who, in criticizing our attempts to prove the inconsistency of R' with the methods of the present paper, made the crucial points clear.
( [1] .
License or copyright restrictions may apply to redistribution; see http://www.ams.org/journal-terms-of-use already discussed in the last section), we have the following theorem(34): Theorem VI. If R' is consistent and we use the same definitions for natural numbers as in R, then the principle of induction in its full generality is independent of the axioms of R' and, in particular, there exists some sentence <pi of R' containing large variables such that </>0 and Vra(c6?Oc&(ra + l)) are provable in R' but ym(pm is not.
It follows that if R' is co-consistent, such a sentence v'mipm must be undecidable in R'.
Another example of undecidable sentences can be obtained if we use considerations similar to those used for 4.20. Let Pci(n) be an arithmetic sentence of R and R' which represents that the rath proof of R is the proof of a definite refutable sentence of R. We have: Moreover, we know that even when we use in R' the same definition of Nn as in R, the induction principle in its generality can be derived from the following form of reducibility principle:
R5. 3yVw(w£y = wr7Ar), or 3aym(mGa = mnX).
Therefore, we have: 5.14. The axiom R5 is independent of the axioms of R'. For similar reason, if m^n stands for \jX((nr¡X &yk(kr¡XZi)(k + \)-qX)) ZitmnX), then the following statement is also independent of the axioms of R':
Of course in R5 and R6 we are assuming that the variables m, n, etc. are introduced in R' with the same definitions as in R.
With regard to Theorem V, Dr. E. Specker has observed that it illustrates how we can express the consistency of a system in different ways and asks the question whether we might find some arithmetic statement in a given system which both expresses the consistency of the system and yet (in spite of Gödel's theorem) is provable in the system(35).
We should like to suggest as a possible example the arithmetic statement Con2 (L) of R' and L, where L has the same notation as R' but contains only the axioms of R plus the quantification theory for the large variables. Al-(M) This theorem and a number of other conclusions of the present paper are summarized in Wang [3] . However, in Theorem 9 of Wang [3] , which answers to the present theorem, the example in parentheses should be deleted. Moreover, the arguments in the lines fourteen to twenty on p. 451 of Wang [3] are also in error and should be corrected according to the more detailed discussions of the present paper. On the other hand, viewed from the number theory developed in R', it seems completely justifiable to say that Con2 (L) as a statement of L also expresses the consistency of L.
Another remark relates to the possibility of proving co-consistency. By 5.9 and Gödel's theorem, it follows that Con2 (Rf) is not provable in R'. But we know(36) that if R is co-consistent, then Rf is consistent.
Therefore, either (1) the co-consistency of R is not provable in R', or (2) we cannot formalize in R' the proof for the assertion that Rf is consistent, if R is co-consistent. Which of the two alternatives is the case? The answer seems to depend again on how we define the notion of co-consistency which is closely related to the natural numbers and pseudo-natural numbers allowable by the axioms and definitions of the system. Let us consider merely the simple case where we assume R contains only the normal natural numbers 0 (the empty set), 0 + 1 or 1 (the unit set of 0), 1 + 1 or 2 (the unit set of 1), etc. and no more.
5.15. The arithmetic statement w Con2 (R) of R' (R is co-consistent) expresses that for every (p of R if c60, <pl, (p2, etc. are all provable in R, then -yjmipm is not provable in R.
Using this definition, we can prove with the known arguments ( etc. are all theorems of R, then, by 5.15, -w Con2 (R). If there is a numeral n such that Pc(ti) is provable in R, then -Con2 (R) and therefore, by 5.15, -w Con2 (R). It is not hard to formalize the argument in R'. Therefore, we can also infer the following conclusion: Theorem VII. Although R' contains a normal truth definition for R and we can prove the consistency of R (viz., Con2 (R)), we cannot prove the (¿-consistency of R (viz. wCon2 (R)) in R' unless R' is inconsistent.
We may take this opportunity to state a few simple observations regarding the connection between truth definitions and consistency proofs. Tarski often stresses the importance of the truth schema. Given two systems S and S', he often asks whether there is a class or predicate Tr of S' such that every statement which falls under the following schema is a theorem of S': In this schema the letter p can be replaced by any statement of the system S and the letter x by the metalogical designation (name, Gödel number, etc.) of this statement.
Let us say that S' contains a truth definition for S if and only if we can find a class or predicate Tr in S' and prove all the cases of (T), and that S' contains a normal truth definition for S if S contains both a truth definition for S and derivatively a consistency proof for S (or in other words, roughly speaking, S' contains a truth definition for S according to which all the theorems of S are true). Obviously, 5.17. There exist systems S and S' such that S' contains a truth definition for S but no normal one.
For example, take S to be the full Zermelo set theory with all its axioms, and S' to be the system Si (see §2) ; since the former is easily seen to be "stronger" than the latter, there can be no consistency proof for S in S'.
Moreover, if we call a truth definition for S abnormal if some theorems of S come out false according to the definition, we can also find systems S and S' such that S' contains an abnormal truth definition for S. For example, this would be the case if we take again the full Zermelo theory as S and take Si plus a contradictory of the axiom of infinity for the elements of Si (values of the small variables) as S'.
There is the question whether S' is stronger than S or whether S' is translatable into S, if S' contains a truth definition for S. To answer these questions, we must of course first make clear what we mean by being stronger than or being translatable into another system. Let us assume the definitions we employed on a previous occasion(38), which do not appear far removed from our ordinary use of such words as modelling, translation, and strength of systems.
As we have shown there, it then follows from Gödel's theorem that if S' is sufficient for ordinary number theory and contains a normal truth definition for S, then S' is not translatable into S and S' has no model in S. If further S' contains S as a part then S' is stronger than S.
However, using the same definitions, it is perfectly possible that S' contains a truth definition for S but is both weaker than and translatable into S. For example, Si contains a truth definition for the full Zermelo theory, but it is easily shown that Si is translatable into the latter but the latter is not translatable into Si. Although Tarski has shown(39) that no system S' with the same notation as a system S can contain a truth definition (normal or not) for S, we cannot infer that S' must be stronger than S if S' contains any truth definition for S at all. [September On the other hand, it is possible that S' and S have the same linguistic forms, and yet S' contains some "transformed" truth definition for S in the sense that there is a correlation of all the sentences of S with some sentences of S of certain special forms and for which latter there is a truth definition in S' (normal or not). For example, this seems to be what is happening when we say that a (transformed) normal truth definition for one system of the Zermelo set theory (for example, the original Zermelo system as refined by Skolem) can be found in another (for example, the Zermelo-Fraenkel), which has the same linguistic forms but contains additional axioms (the axiom of substitution in the case of our example) (40 First we give in summary brief descriptions of the principal systems considered in the preceding sections.
(1) S3 is a very weak set theory in which we assume merely the null set and the finite sets constructed out of it; S3 has the same notations as the ordinary Zermelo set theory (one primitive predicate and one kind of variable only) and contains merely the axiom of extensionality, the axiom of null set, and an axiom saying that by adding a new member to a given set, we have again a set. As we know, S3 has a simple model in the elementary theory of numbers.
( is again a set) involving a free class variable; S2 is the partial system of the Neumann-Bernays system as determined by the axioms of the groups I-III and Va of Bernays [l ] , and So is related to S2 as the Zermelo-Fraenkel system is to the Neumann-Bernays.
(5) S4 is roughly the ordinary Zermelo set theory (including, beyond the axioms of S6, the axioms of infinity, power set, and sum set), and S6 is related to S4 as S3 is to Si. We note that in S& the Aussonderungsaxiom remains the same as in S4 and no references to classes are allowed in defining sets (or elements).
S5' is a further extension of Ss where the restriction is removed and the new Aussonderungsaxiom states (as in S2) that the intersection of a set and a class is again a set.
(6) F is a system which is formulated in the notation of ordinary Zermelo set theory but is as strong as an extension of Si related to Si as S2 is to So or, alternatively, as a third order predicate calculus with only predicative classes on the highest level. An important feature of R is that it contains only a finite number of proper axioms (i.e., axioms beyond quantification theory). R' is an extension of R related to R as Si is to S3; Rf is obtained from R by adding Con (R) as a new axiom.
We note that S2 is related to S6 in the same way as the Neumann-Bernays system (cf. Bernays [l ] , to be referred to as the system NB) is to the ZermeloFraenkel (obtained from S4 by adding the Ersetzungsaxiom and the Fundierungsaxiom, to be referred to as the system ZF). When two systems S" and S are related in the same way as NB is to ZF, we say that S" is a predicative extension of S. Thus, Theorem II (in §2) and the results 4.17-4.21 (in §4) are concerned with the relations between systems and their predicative extensions.
Si and Sz, S5 and S4, R' and R are all related to each other in the same way. When S' and S are thus related, we say that S' is an impredicative extension of S. Thus, Si is an impredicative extension of S3, Ss is one of S4, R' is one of R. The main results in this paper (including the Theorems I, IV, V, VI) are all concerned with the relations between systems and their impredicative extensions. The interest and validity of these results depends largely on the relative consistency of a system and its impredicative extension, first established by the present author (see Wang [3] and Wang [4] ). It seems proper to say that the relative consistency of a system and its predicative extension is much less surprising than that of a system and its impredicative extension. Indeed, the former seems to have been widely accepted even before rigorous proofs by Dr. Novak and others appeared; and usually we assume that Con (S) cannot be proved in a predicative extension S" because impredicative classes are needed, even when we still have no exact formalization of the matter. On account of these circumstances, we believe that the main results of the present paper have no analogues in studies where merely relations between a system and its predicative extension are considered. There is a definite sentence H(x) of NB such that (if NB is consistent) we can prove in NB both H (I) and \fn(H(n)DH(n + l)), but not \fnH(n).
(Mill) There is a definite expression H'(x) of NB such that (if NB is consistent) we cannot prove in NB: 3X\fx(xr]X = H'(x)). Since we know that the relative consistency of NB to ZF can be proved in NB and therefore that the consistency of ZF cannot be proved in NB, the above three theorems are intended to explain more precisely why Con (ZF) is not provable in NB. But our theorem is stronger and Mostowski does not seem to realize(42) that sometimes we can find in S' a truth definition for S although S' is weaker than S in the usual sense of "being weaker than." Our discussion in § §2 and 5 stress, among other things, this point.
(Mil) is an analogue of our Theorem VI (in §5). (Compare also the first half of Theorem 9 in Wang [3].) But they are concerned with different systems and call for completely different proofs.
These observations should suffice to dispel the doubts which Mostowski has expressed(43) regarding the validity of the results summarized in Wang [3] and to explain the extent to which the results of Mostowskii are similar to those of Wang [3 ] and the present paper. With regard to the few analogous results, Mostowski graciously credits(44) priority to me, but I believe that he probably reached his conclusions (45) at nearly the same time as Professor Rosser and myself.
Among the systems we tabulated under (l)-(6), the relation between S6' and Si is again of a different sort. S¿ differs from a predicative extension of S4 in that it contains in addition also the impredicative classes; while it (") Ibid., line 24.
C5) Professor Mostowski's explanation, in the middle of Mostowskii, p. 118, of the reason why the consistency of ZF is not provable in NB is in error. Since this mistake in exposition has led to serious misunderstandings, he is planning to publish a note of correction in Fundamenta Mathematicae.
differs from the impredicative extension S5 of S4 in that class variables are allowed in defining sets. In other words, it actually contains all the axioms of both extensions of S4. When S'" and S are related in such a way, we shall say that S'" is an irreducible extension of S. Thus S¿ is an irreducible extension of S4.
As we have mentioned above (cf. 4.13 in §4), the consistency of S4 is provable in S¿. Moreover, since we can prove in S¿ that there exists an inductive set (cf. remark after Theorem V in §5)(46), and that the intersection of a class and a set is again a set, the intersection of all inductive classes of S¿ is the same as the intersection of all the inductive sets of S¿. Therefore, if we define in S4 the set Nn of all natural numbers as the intersection of all its inductive sets and use the same formal definition in S5', we can in St still make induction on all classes and therefore all sentences of S¿ (compare the remarks about R5 in §5). Hence, by arguments similar to those for 5.10 (in §5), we can derive Con (S4#) from Con (Si) in S¿, where S4# is related to S4 as Rf is to R. Hence, Con (S4#) is also a theorem of S6'. But we know (compare the proof of 5.11 in §5) that we can also derive Con (St) from Con (S4#) in St-Therefore, Con (Si) is also provable in S¿ and Con (S4#) is not provable in St. Hence, S¿ is demonstrably stronger (in the sense of Wang Let NQ be the system obtained from NB by adding all the impredicative classes. Then NQ is an irreducible extension of ZF, related to ZF as Sí is to S4. By reasoning similar to those in the preceding paragraph, we can prove Con (ZF) and Con (ZF#) in NQ (ZF# is to ZF as Rf is to R). Since we know that Con (ZF) cannot be proved in NB, it also follows that there must be certain impredicative classes which cannot be proved to exist in NB. Indeed, since the relative consistency of NB to ZF can be proved in NQ, Con (NB) can also be proved in NQ(47). It is not clear whether Con (NB) might also be provable in the impredicative extension of ZF, which is demonstrably weaker than NQ (just as St is weaker than S¿ ).
The most common examples of irreducible extensions seem to be the cases where S is the ordinary rath order (ra being 2, 3, 4, • • • ) predicate calculus and S'" is the (ra + l)th. If we take natural numbers as the individuals (the entities of the first or lowest type) of these systems, then we see that what we have said about S4, St, St all apply (mutatis mutandis) to the systems S, S' (the impredicative extension of S) and S'", respectively. A similar but slightly different case is the following. Let R* be the system obtained from R' by adding the new axiom R5 (stating that every class of (46) This of course depends on the definitions of zero and the successor function, and the particular form of the axiom of infinity. For instance, if we use the original Zermelo axiom of infinity and define zero and the successor function as in 2.1 and 2.2 (of §2), then the sum set of the postulated infinite set is an inductive set.
(") This possibility is asserted in Mostowskii, last footnote on p. 113, without proof.
